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1. 
Usually the representatives of lslamic studies - like those of 
Orientalism in general - consider philology an irrportant precondi-
tion for their scientific activities. Well equipped with philologi-
cal tools and methods, they have been for generations deeply engaged 
in studies in the fields of theology, literature, history and 
cul ture in i t s roost general meaning. Mmy scholars gained thei r 
carpetence in roore than one of these fields, often without clear 
terrporal and thematic limitations of their interests. Even today the 
so-called ''üc;:-lisanl " often is regarded as the ideal representative 
of his art: he is distinguished by his profound philological 
knowledge of the three roost irrportant languages of the lslamic world 
and by his corrpetence in the realities of this fields within the 
widest and deepest possible dimensions. 
In these circumstances, the contributions of the Orientalists to 
scientific research on the Near, Middle and Far East have until 
recently shown quite specific features. They have produced a nurrber 
of out standing resul t s, and thei r phi lological ly based studies and 
research might not have been easily achieved within other scientific 
disciplines even v.hen these also deal with Oriental affairs. 
But the limitations of methodological traditions might also be of 
the reasons v.hy Orientalists have often neglected irrportant 
questions of Eastern affairs v.hich were roore or less broadly 
discussed within other disciplines. Students of Islam, in general, 
are no exception to this rule. By way of illustration, 1 should like 
to examine their way of dealing with, or, roore precisely, of 
neglecting, the therratic carplex of \\hat is called rent-capitalism. 
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Bobek's conception of rent-capitalism 'Was originally based. on a 
"geographic point of view". Nevertheless, he presented. his ccncep-
tion as a very ancient socio-economic forrra.tion with a genuine 
historical dimensicn. This could have been a sufficient reascn for 
Orientalists specialized. in lslamic history to pay attention to 
rent-capi tal ism in their works. But this, curicusly enoogh, has 
scarcely happened. so far. lt cannot be denied. that several lslamic 
historians have been recently dealing with questions of social and 
eccnomic structures in the lslamic world. lt is irrpossible to 
menticn even only a selecticn of names, works and topics within the 
frame of thi s paper. We have to assume that rmny sources for the 
socio-economic history of the Near East are now accessible to the 
public. Similarly, there are countless studies in social and 
economic institutions and also repeated. atterrpts to describe and 
evaluate socio-economic systems within lslamic history. l shall rely 
cn sane results of such studies in lslamic history in order to 
explore the extent to which rent- capitalist elernents are actually 
traceable and evident throughcut the lslamic pericxi of Near and 
Middle Eastern history, or, at least, to which extent such elernents 
could be expected to becane more obvicus by future research. 
l I. 
As characteristic features of a rent-capitalist structure of society 
and eccnalo/ Bobek st resses, among other point s, "the t ight connexion 
between rulership and cities", "Tue exploitation of rural and trade 
producers by skimning off excessive shares of the produce" ( the 
so-called. "rents") the coomercialization of "rent-titles", almost no 
productive investments by the owners and - as a result of all these 
factors - the stagnation in the development of rmterial means of 
producticn and the stationary character of societies subdued. to 
this system. lnstitutions and forms of other, more ancient, economic 
structures sometimes rmy overlap with rent-capitalist structures. 
Tue most 
Bobek, is 
obvious illustration of rent-capitalism, according to 
to be observed. in the relations of ownerhip in the 
agricultural field where "the rent-capi talist 's absolute ideal seems 
1 
l 
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to be the entanglement of as rmny peasants as possible in perrmnent 
debts, so that their annual payments would never be able to 
coopensate the already legendary original <lebt". The peasants' 
production is usually partitioned in separate factors: soil, water, 
seeds, tools and/or livestock and hurmn labor; the ownership of any 
one of these factors corresponds to one share of the crop, e.e. the 
"rent". Bobek repeatedly stresses the parasitic nature of the 
rent-capitalist exploiters and attributes the same parasitic nature 
to the ci ty v.hich he regards as the cent er and residence of the 
dominating authority, in contrast with the surrounding countryside. 
lt was this particular point that stirrulated first criticism and 
modificat ions of the rent-capi tal ist theory (as an exarrple: Eugen 
Wirth). Gunter Leng put the v.hole concept in question, using 
criteria of Historical :Materialism. Leng blamed Bobek for having 
overstressed secundary aspects of economic organization and having, 
above all, denied the inportance of the basic relations of 
production. Yet Bobek's intention was precisely to relate the 
concept of capitalism in the first place with fonml aspects of 
economic activities. Instead, Leng follows suggestions of B. 
Brentjes, a :Marxist historian of the Middle East; contrary to rmny 
other :Marxist models, he proposes to recognize only one world-wide, 
pre-capitalist social fomation, v.hich he calls "feudalism" 
regardless of the rather unf ortunate use of the term. According to 
Brentjes, this "feudalism" is based on the "chasing after the 
agrarian surplus product ". Thi s chasing i s based on the ''predominant 
rural relations of production, particularly on the situation of the 
peasants v.ho, through non-economic corrpulsion, were deprived of 
their personal freedom or their ownership of soil". This mode of 
consideration would exenpt the rraterialist historian from feeling 
obliged pemanently to label historical, social and economic 
ci rcumstances. The f rui t 1 essness of such label ing can be easi ly 
detected in a large nurri:>er of otherwise valuable works written by 
Soviet orientalists during the last decades. Tue obvious disadvan-
tage of Leng' s proposal resides in his general label "feudalism" 
v.hich hardly offers any possibility of conclusions concerning 
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eventually particular social relations and conditions. 
1he concept of rent-capitalism proved to be stinulating and 
productive, especially in the field of geographical studies on the 
Near and Middle East. Bobek has obviously created a very practical 
instrument \\hich is extremely useful for explanations and descrip-
tions of recent socio- econanic affairs in rra.ny countries and areas. 
The carplete rejection of Bobek's idea of rent-capitalism would 
irrply the renounciation of all these advantages that have been 
realized through the application of this concept on concrete 
problems. 
In this question, one rra.y find help in sane ideas of those 
Orientalists expecially interested in history and social science. I 
should like to refer particularly to the French scholars Claude 
Cahen and Mlxirne Rodinson. In thei r works on quest ions of social 
st ructures in the Islamic world they have repeat edly point ed out the 
evident fact that there rra.y always exi st various econanic f orms 
within different social fornations. In some of his writings, Cahen 
stressed the existence and irrportance of \\hat he calls "the 
capitalist sector" in the econanic life of rnedieval Islamic 
societies. Rodinson has developed this idea further and even worked 
out theoretical dirnensions the significance of \\hich is no more 
conf ined to the Islamic world. Rodinson considers the problem in a 
''world wide perspective". He assumes that before the outspread of 
capitalism (in the sense of Mux) there existed "infinitely various 
mx:l.es of production having exploiting structures. Within these modes 
of production a cormunity rra.y exploit another ... , or, individuals 
rra.y be exploi t ed by single merrbers of the superirrposed "class" or 
society; or they rra.y be exploited by this society collectively". 1he 
stages of developrnent of such social fornations, \\hich cannot be 
easily classified, are valid only within a regional frarnework. Any 
staternent of CaTJn)n aspects of these fornations beyond the regional 
frarne would necessarily be based on vague generalizations. 1he 
significance of such fornations is characterized by the interlacing 
and overlapping of different modes of production. To describe these 
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f orrmt ions preci sely, Rcxl.inson proposes to include not only the 
possible dominaticn of a particular roode of prcxl.ucticn, but also 
secondary economic and even cultural aspects. These secondary 
aspect s, "even if they were not fundamental, rmy be highly irrportant 
and roodi fy the st ructure or singl e aspect s of the \\hole soci ety". 
Such a secondary economic aspect could be the exi st ence of a 
capitalist sector in a pre-capitalist society. 
lf we explore the existence and character of such eventual 
"capitalist sectors" within the history of the central lslamic 
lands, the concept of rent-capi tal i sm irrmedia t ely gains pract i cal 
irrportance. In this paper 1 shall try to present scme indications of 
the existence of rent- capitalist elements present in the sources 
accessible to me. Thanks to the diligence of generations of 
scholars, rminly Orientalists, we already dispose of a rather large 
nurrber of hi stori cal sources deal ing wi th the social and economic 
problems of the lslamic world. Yet, the available sources are still 
rruch fewer than those we have for the history of roost European 
countries. The inforrmtion we can extract from these sources enable 
us only occasionally to work out general aspect s and judgement s. 
rvbreover, 1 shall here confine nyself to the history of lslamic 
Iran, wi thout refraining, however, from rmking scme general 
statements beyond this scope. 
III. 
The pract i ce of crop-sharing, prevai 1 ing in agri cul ture in roost 
lslamic countries up to recent times, gave to Bobek an essential 
evidence of what he considers to be rent-capitalist exploitation. 
Our sources give us enough evidence f or the divi sion of the crop 
according to a fixed proportion to the titles of 0\1111ership, even 
during the early lslamic centuries. Curiously enough, the juridic 
regulations of that time referring to crop-sharing scarcely differ 
from those prevailing up till the twentieth century. The crop-
sharing cont ract roost ly in use between landlord and peasant has the 
form of the so-called rruzara'a. This contract fixes the partition of 
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the crop (usually five part s) and i s to be regarded as one of the 
classical agrarian regulat ions of early Islam. Sirrul taneoosly there 
existed special regulations for irrigated, intensively cultivated 
land (rrusaqat) and other contracts for newly cultivated territories 
etc. The practice of rruzara'a is well-known to geographers, 
anthropologists and sociologists as being until recently a rrain 
feature of agriculture in Oriental societies. Yet, althoogh the 
usage of rruzara'a was quite comnon in scme lslamic regions (Egypt, 
Iran etc.) as early as more than thousands years ago and that a 
simi lar system of relat ionship between landlord and peasant exi st s 
until today, that does not necessarily irrply that present conditions 
have prevai led cont inoosly du ring all these centuries. 
First of all l am going to describe a forrral institutional 
pre-conditicn for the distributicn of rruzara'a in early Islam. The 
Islamic law originally classified two types of land, according to 
the owner's right to dispose of the soil. The first category, 
"rrulk", was applied exclusively to territories that were, theoreti-
cally, properties "inherited" by M.islims since pre-Islamic times. 
So, their titles of 0\1111ership were recognized by Islam. Conse-
quent ly, i t was irrpossibl e t o obtain land of thi s ca t egory in the 
conquered regions because they belonged to the cormuni ty of all 
M.islims. The usufructuaries of this type of land - i.e land 
belonging to the conquered territories - could hardly claim on any 
titles of unconditioned lando\1111ership, i.e. including the rights of 
inheri tance or sel 1 ing. The two ca t egori es were di st ingui shed by 
clearly different forms of taxation. The usufructuary of conquered 
and registered "state-land" had to pay a land-tax - the so-called 
kharadj - of rather high percentage to the fiscal authorities; 
sometimes, exceptionally, as high as 40 or 50 percent. This land-tax 
can be interpreted as a tenure-rent payable to the state. In 
contrast, 0\1111ers of rrulk-territory had to pay instead of land-taxes, 
the canonic alms-tax (zakat) only, \\hich was fixed toten percent of 
the crop in the case of cultivated land ('ushr). The first essential 
modification of this regulation still in early Islamic times took 
place \\hen certain military and political personalities were given 
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special titles of daninion over kharadj-territories. This was 
possibly rneant as a kind of salary for their services to the state. 
Thus, sane areas, f ormerly regarded as kharadj -land, were actually 
changed into a new type of land, the so-called "qati 'a" (pl.: 
qata'i'). The owner of a qati'a was not anyroore expected to pay 
kharadj for his land, but was, fiscally, equalled with the 
proprietors of rrulk-areas. This regulaticn f ormed the first step to 
a rapid and far-reaching similarity between qati 'a and rrulk. The 
fast expansicn of qati 'a areas led to a rise of a new social layer 
of powerful landowners. Sirrul taneously, the socio-econcmic agrarian 
structure of the territories in questicn was entirely changed within 
a short time. The forrner usufructuaries of kharadj-areas were, as a 
consequence of the integration of their land into a qati'a, in fact, 
expropriated. Juridically, this expropriation was realized by means 
of rruzara'a or other forms of crop-sharing contracts. Such contracts 
allowed the owner of a qati 'a to convert his title of authority, 
W'lich included his quasi-ownerhip of the soil, into reirarkable 
profits. In practice, the principle of inheritance prevailed within 
the qati 'a-lands after, a rather short period. The way the lords of 
qati 'a - areas consolidated their dcminating and profiting position 
rray, in rrany respects, have reserrbled Bobek's description of the 
practices of rent-capitalist landowners. Obviously, the expansion of 
the qati 'a-system caused a similar large- scaled expansion of 
rruzara 'a, W'lich, as already mentioned, deemed a typically rent-
capi talist way of peasant 's exploitaticn in the Islamic world. The 
strict application of rruzara'a left for the peasant only the fifth 
part of his annual produce, whereas the amount he would have paid as 
kharadj would have rarely been rnore than fifty percent. Before the 
rise of the qati 'a-system crop-sharing practices were, if ever, in 
the fi rst instance appl ied t o rrulk-areas, the ext ent of which was 
always less than that of kharadj-terri tories. The probably very 
anci ent origins and t radi t ions of rruzara 'a and other crop-sharing 
practices -though of possibly high interest to the cul tural 
historian - are of no significance in this connection. 
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IV. 
By the lOth century, the distribution of qati 'a-lands had already 
passed its culminating point. As far as the social and econanic 
consequences of the fati 'a-system are concemed one nay only venture 
sane speculations and hypothetic conclusions. In this connection 
research should be cent ered on the quest ion, ~ether and to ~ich 
extent the successive owners of qati 'as gave up their original 
pol it ical and mi l i tary funct ions, ~ich had formed the prinary 
reasons for their acquisition of those qati 'as- and tumed to other 
professions (e.g. carmerce etc.). 
At any rate, during the lOth century the qati 'a-systemwas gradually 
replaced by another one. This happened, presumably, as a result of 
increasing difficulties in the distribution of new qati 'as: Tue 
nurrber of al ready exi st ing qat i 'as had presumably beccme so large 
that there was not enough land f or additional bestowal. lt seems 
that the necessary payments of highly-ranking bureaucrats and 
military officers were less and less covered by means of this 
system. According to the new procedure, the fiscal administration 
resorted to stopping the cash payment of salaries as well as the 
bestowal of any qati 'as. lnstead, they granted concessions or 
assignments of taxes: Salaried persons were now given the right of 
collecting the fixed tax-revenue of a certain territory. Conterrpo-
rary administrative law regarded this practice as a rnodification of 
the tradi tional qati 'a-systern. In fact, this change created 
precondi t ions for a new kind of landownership ~ich was pract iced 
scarcely in the lslamic territories until then; this new type of 
landlordship was the so-cal l ed "iqta"-syst em. 
Owners of such an iqta' had legal 
preci sely def ined tax-revenue and, 
claims only concerning 
theref ore, t ook over 
the 
the 
funct ions of tax-collectors. The val idi ty of an iqta' was usually 
confined to a certain territory and a certain tax-revenue. The iqta' 
was limitated in time and, from the juridical point of view, it 
excl uded any t i t 1 e of inheritance. During the 11 th and 12th centur-
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ies, the iqta'-system fonned the basis for the mJst widespread type 
of landownership, especially within the state of the Great-Seljuqs, 
i.e. the rmjor part of the Eastem Caliphate. In particular, the 
usufructuaries of large and vast iqta 'at in Iran were powerful 
military leaders, rnost of \ffian were then chieftains of Turkish 
tribes and troops originating fran Central Asia. Notwithstanding the 
juridic regulations, they soon atterrpted to further their rights of 
land-control into titles of unconditioned landownership. lt goes 
wi thout saying that in thi s regard they could easi ly rely on the 
loyalty and support of their military or tribal adherents. As long 
as the central power was strong enough, these atterrpts were of 
limi t ed success. Whenever the cent ral state weakened, such large 
iqta 'at usually proved to be starting points for the forrmtion of 
new states, that were rather srmll at first. The tight connection of 
fiscal administration and military force in the iqta'-system 
obvi cusly encouraged the increase of pol i t i cal power of the 
iqta'-holders. Our sources offer vague indications that the 
peasantry rray have known a relative material prosperity \ffiich was, 
however, threatened by the general political instability. 
One rmy cautiously conclude that the iqta '-system did not encourage 
rent-capitalist practices in order to skim off the surplus of 
agrarian product ion in the same way as wi th the fonnerly widespread 
qati 'a- and rrulk-terri tories. In contrast to these, the large iqta' 
in particular offered its holder all preconditions to encounter the 
agrarian producer with certain elements of state-power, i.e., with a 
trained bureaucracy and military power. In rmny respects, the 
intemal administration of such an iqta' reflected the structure of 
the \\hole state. The surplus of production, e.e. the rent, was 
exacted in the form of taxes; salaries within the iqta' were given 
by means of assigning sub-iqta 'at" of corrparatively srmller 
dimensions. At terrpt s to irrprove de-facto-right s of property on an 
iqta' were usually supported by the increase in political power on 
the side of the iqta'- system and rruzara'a or other forms of 
crop-sharing. Facing the power rrachinery of the iqta' holder, the 
peasants were usually organized in village-camunities. Their 
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elected speakers were responsible for the payment of taxes. 
Seme scholars tried to interpret the development of the iqta'-system 
as a resul t of the irrmigrat ion of Cent ral Asian horse-namds - roost 
of them Turks - into the Central lslamic regions. This theory is 
difficult to accept: During its earliest phase, the iqta'-system had 
obviously been created to cover the salary of bureaucrats, v.ho were 
not of foreign origin. The roodel of this procedure was an 
administrative practice v.hich had already existed in pre-Islamic 
times. Later, the application of this system to the new class of 
roostly Turkish military leaders led to the development mentioned 
above. One should not forget, that not all institutions juridically 
called iqta' encouraged the political advancement of their holders. 
There were also very limited salaries paid in the form of 
tax-assignments; so they were considered juridically as iqta 'at, 
even v.hen their values were minirral. 
With regard to politics the iqta'-system proved tobe a rather 
destabi lizing factor. Since any right of property - especially the 
right if inheri tance - was to be supported rrainly by increasing 
political and military power, the control of middle and large-size 
iqta'at underwent streng fluctuations. 
V. 
A roore developed stage of the iqta'-systern had its culminating point 
in l ran between the mid-f oort eenth and the end of the sixt eenth 
centuries. The political framework for this was formed by the fall 
of the Mongol, 11-Khanid state in Iran (about 1336). The subsequent 
power vacuum encouraged the rise of several rather instable, 
regional states. Their intemal structure was to scme extent based 
on the large, iqta'-like dominions of roore or less tribal character. 
The Mongol rul e in l ran, v.ho had reigned roore than a century did not 
at fi rst recognize the lslamic law, but followed foreign, i.e. 
Mongol, traditions. As a result of this the iqta' underwent a new 
development with regard to administrative law: The forrral regula-
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tions were no roore closely bound to lslamic norms, but became 
largely adapted to the political and econcmic realities. Further-
roore, the new regulations remained in application even after the 
general return to lslamic custorns. 
Since about 1350 thi s advanced form of the t radi t ional iqta' was 
called soyurghal. Fran that time onwards, the term iqta' was used 
exclusively as an obsolete denornination for the now obsolete form of 
that institution. With regard to legal history, the soyurghal 
included several elements, originating in Mongol, Uighur or even 
Chinese traditions. Previcusly an iqta' holder could claim his right 
of dorninion over his territory only by means of his real power. This 
right became juridi cally a substant ial part of the invest i ture of a 
soyurghal, as cl early shown by document s concerning the grant ing of 
soyurghals. These roostly include unrestricted titles of jurisdic-
tion, administrative and fiscal authority, and, above all, the 
principle of inheritance. Beyond that, other forms of payment 
continued to exist, all of them operating as tax-assignments. 
Tue state administration at that time generally followed a 
conception slightly roodified frcm the original lslamic idea of 
land-categories: The major part of arable territory was classified 
as so-called "divani-land", i.e. corrpletely dependent on the state's 
very elaborate rules of taxation. This type of land was generally in 
accordance with \\hat was formerly called kharadj-land. All kinds of 
tax-concessions could be given out of the vi rtual tax-revenues of 
any divani-terri tory. These concessions may vary fran large sized 
soyurghal s to very sirrple tax-assignment s, such as paying of mior 
salari es, covering only fract ions of tax-revenues. The peasant s in 
these dovamJ-territories underwent forms of exploitation \\flieh 
hardly accord wi th \\hat i s usually underst ocx:l. as rent-capi tal i sm. 
But rent-capitalist practices continued to exist within other 
agrarian territories \\flieh were part of the second category, 
"rrulk"(i.e., unconditioned property). Tue percentage of rrulk-estates 
had declined remarkably during the fourteenth century. The owners of 
such rrulk-estates were victims of an increasing juridical uncert-
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ainty. They were continuously threatened by acts of royal confisca-
tion. As already mentioned, throughout the M:mgol period admini-
strative and fiscal law was in rrany respects different to -....hat had 
been regarded as Islamic laws. Consequently, rrany proprietors of 
rrulk-land lost their original status -....hich had formerly been rruch 
TIDre secure. 
Another land-ca t egory, the so-call ed cro'Wl1-areas ( ''khass") should be 
seen as a special case of rrulk. These terri tories were usually 
separated from divani-areas by royal decree and turned into private 
property for the ruler and his family. As already mentioned, 
khass-land was frequently enlarged also by confiscation of rrulk-
terri tories, resulting either from the ruler's arbitrary action, or 
from ccnpul sory sal e and simi lar measures. The ground-rent wi thin 
crO'Wl1-territories was not collected by fiscal agents but by special 
officials obedient to the ruler. The rent was not due to the fiscal 
authorities but exclusively to the King's private treasury. Thus, 
within these territories the rent was fixed and collected by other 
measures than taxation. 
The fourth land category was the terri tories resul ting from pious 
endownents (vaqf, pl.: auqaf). The establishment and ad.ministration 
of such areas was always based on strict Islamic laws and 
regulations. Since early times, the vaqf-system rmy have resemled a 
kind of stronghold of rent-capitalist exploitation, performed by a 
sane-....hat anonymous institution. 
Unt i l the end of the sixteenth century the divani-type of arable 
land prevailed clearly throughout Iran. The extension of the three 
other categories was ccnparatively inferior. In some aspects, this 
rray not totally apply to the Tirrurid period; yet, this is not 
inportant for our present discussion. Wi thin the frame of divani-
land the relationship between peasant and landlord (i .e. the state, 
the O'Wl1ers of soyurghal s and beneficiari es of other kinds of 
tax-assignment s) can not adequat ely be explained by means of Bobek' s 
rent-capitalist criteria. An exception for this rule is possibly the 
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practice of tax-farming, i.e., the leasing for a lunp sum of 
definite tax-revenues to wealthy persons with sufficient capital. 
But there is rruch evidence that tax-farming was a very limi t ed 
pract ice down to the seventeenth century. The juridical regulat ions 
of the other tree categories of land (i.e. rrulk, khass and vaqf) 
gave rruch roore encouragement to rent-capitalist practices. As a 
whole, however, in Iran and during the late Middle Ages and the 
early Modem Times, the existence of rent-capitalism in the agrarian 
sector was rather restricted. This fact is corroborated by our 
sources. The relationship between landlord and peasant was over-
whelmingly based cn element s of daninicn and authori ty, and 
strikingly characterized by bureaucratic and military features. 
In the urban settlements too, there existed probably similar mixed 
socio-econanic condi tions throughout this period. But we have to 
admi t that socio-econanic lif e in medieval Irani an ci t ies has not 
yet been studi ed thoroughly enough. As far as we know, the urban 
artisan corporations (sinf, pl.: asnaf; often, misleadingly, 
translated as guilds) and their functionaries served, above all, as 
mediators to taxation. Despite of certain aspects of socio- economic 
interrelationship within the bazars, we lack sufficient inforrm.tion 
ccncerning questions of property and disposal of production means in 
the Islamic cities. Therefore, I would rather not discuss here the 
irrportance of rent-capitalism in the field of production due to 
urban trade. lt goes withcut saying that eventual "capitalist 
sectors" in the ecooanic life of these times (e.g., carmercial or 
usuricus capitals, etc.) were naturally coocentrated in the cities. 
We rra.y assume that, at that time, urban life was rra.rked by a dense 
mixture of varicus econanic forms. Further research is, however, 
necessary to answer the question to which extent rent-capitalism was 
really typical in this connection. For the time being, this could be 
accepted in Bobek's and Wirth's conceptions, though always carbinded 
with other elements, such as bureaucracy and political or military 
dominion. 
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VI. 
The instable forerunners of the Safavid state were rrade out of 
Turcanan tribal federations; in eastern Iran, the Safavids succeeded 
,to the descendants of Tinur. In the beginning, the basis of Safavid 
power was fonned as well by the military potential of mostly 
Turcanan normdic tribes in Anatolia and northwestern Iran, the 
so-called Qizilbash. However, their ideological ties with the ruling 
dynasty consi sted, prirrarily, of religious el ement s, in cont rast to 
the fonner federations of the Qqara--Qoyunlu and Aq--Qoyunlu, \t.ho were 
exclusively based on t ribal loyal ty. Whereas these Turcamn states 
had been rather ephemeral, the Safavid state was able to survive 
more than two centuries. 
At first, the system of payment by rneans of tax-concessions was 
continued. Nevertheless, there is enough evidence that along wi th 
the increasing consolidat ion and cent rali zat ion of the state, the 
seigneurial rights of the holders of large-sized soyurghals were 
gradually restricted. There was a tendency to replace the institu-
t ioo of the soyurghal, including the far-reaching privi leges and 
preroga t i ves of i t s owners, by means of another one. Thi s new 
institutioo sanehow reserrbled the traditional iqta', especially with 
regard to the question of inheritance, and was called tiyul. Within 
the second half of the sixteenth century, the fonner large-sized 
soyurghals were entirely replaced by tiyuls. The holders of the 
larges tiyuls (frequently of the size of \\hole provinces) were 
usually the chief s of the Qizi lbash t ribes, along wi th other 
high-ranking state functiooaries. At that time these tribal chiefs 
st i 11 held the mi li tary power of the Safavidsta t e. The t enn 
soyurghal rerra.ined restricted to prebends of religirus people and 
was finally even confures with endownent territory. 
During the rule of 'Abbas I (1587-1629) this structure was entirely 
changed: A standing amy wi th exclusive loyal ty to the Shah was 
created. This was done in order to eliminate the destabilizing 
effect \\hich was still exercised by the militarily and politically 
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unrestricted Qizilbash-leaders. The salaries of this new arny were 
to be carri ed rut in cash only. Theref ore, tax-concessions for thi s 
purpose were abandoned. Consequently, even "Mlole provinces were 
wi thdrawn fran the exchequer' s authori ty and subordinated to a newly 
created crown administration. This development reached its highest 
point in the forties of the seventeenth century. At this time, the 
crown-provinces covered nure than 50 percent of the "Mlole territory. 
The relationship between crown-land peasants and their landlord -
rrore preci sely, the Shaw himself and the representat ives of the 
crown-admini st rat irn - was rmrked by the far-reaching absence of 
traditional tax-regulations. The peasants were actually tenants, 
bound by nure or less rruzara'-like contracts. The econanic structure 
of this royal demesne-sector bore therefore rruch nure rent-capi-
talist elements, in Bobek's sense, than the rermining divani-terri-
tory rut of "Mlich tiyuls and other tax-concessions continued to be 
granted. Varirus reports of European travellers of that time convey 
the impression that the average conditions of rmterial life were 
worse in the territories of royal demesne than they were within the 
divani-provinces ("Mlich were then administratively called "rmrmlik). 
Within the crown-provinces ("Mlich productivity ingeneral seems to 
have been regressive. After 1650, however, several crown-provinces 
were reshaped as provinces of the rmrml ik-type. We possess rruch 
evidence to the out spread of famines and rmny cases of peasant s 
deserting their soil in the late Safavid period, especially fran 
crown-estates and areas of pious endownents (vaqf ). 
During the seventeenth century the crown used to interfere also in 
nrn-agrarian econanic af f ai rs, rruch nure than thi s had been commn 
earl ier. In such cases the crown used to apply methods recall ing 
Bobek's criteria for rent-capitalism. There had already been a long 
tradition that rulers invested considerable anuunts ouf of their 
private nuney in comnercial enterprise (e.g., the "urtaq"- system in 
the Tirrurid period). Since 'Abbas I the crown nure and nure used to 
nunopolize entire branches of trade, as for example, the production 
of si lk at all i t s level s. In the last stage, the crown gave up the 
international silk-trade to European comnercial corrpanies, thus 
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corrpletely neglecting the native merchants, with the exception of 
the Armenians. During the late seventeenth century, the wide 
expansion of tax-farming, 'Wh.ich had been rather exceptional in 
earlier times, was an additional syrrptan for the increase of 
rent-capi tal ist aspect s. In tax-farming, the exchequer farmed out 
entire tax-revenues to the highest bidding capitalists; in this case 
the fiscaI authorities renounced their claims for a good part of 
their former regular incane. In addition, tax-farming often enough 
\\0.S exercised in favor of the entire profit of the King's treasury 
only. Particularly during the last decades, tax-farming - the habit 
of farming out offices and state functions - developed; but this 
lease of offices did not reach its culmination in Iran before the 
nineteenth century. 
VII. 
Tue general infiltration of all economic sectors by "rent-
capitalist" eiements is often described, particularly by geogra-
phers, as being typical of recent societies and econcmies in the 
Near and Middle East. Altogether, it seems to me that rent-capita-
li sm in Iran did not totally overdominate other forms of exploi ta-
tic:n earlier than the middle of the 19th century. On the face of it, 
this development, 'Wh.ich took place during the reign of Nasir ad-Din 
Shah (1849-1896), was accorrpanied with several additional factors: 
Tue traditional military structures, still based on tribal elements, 
were reduced and gradually replaced by a Europeanized standing arrry. 
At the same time, the traditional tax-assignments (the tiyuls) were 
fonm.lly abandoned. This did not happen earlier, but during the late 
19th century. What had been tiyul-territory until that time, was now 
establ i shed as regular, uncondi t ioned land-property, just in that 
form, as it is considered today to have been typical of the Middle 
East up to our time. Only then, the rruzara'a system of crop-sharing 
became a general f eature of the relat ionship between peasant and 
landlord in Iran, as it is described by Bobek as a typical element 
of rent-capitalism. As mentioned above, the rruzara'a was a very 
ancient and traditional form of landownership, but its general 
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expansion within almost the \twhole agrarian sector is obviously the 
resul t of a very recent development. Thi s does not only apply to 
Iran. Indeed, the history of Turkey and other territories of the 
former Ottamn Enpire, especially Egypt, offers evidence of a 
similar development, though within a different tenporal frame and 
with regard to different institutional structures. Additional 
elements described by Bobek as typical of rent-capitalist societies 
are also noticeable cn a broader scale in Iran only since the middle 
of the 19th century, e.g., the destruction of village-camunities. 
As al ready seen, these vi llage-coorruni t i es exerci sed thrrughout cen-
turi es a mediat ing funct ion between rural producers and the 
exchequer of the landlords, wi thin the iqta '-, soyurghal- and 
tiyul-systems, in order to guarantee the payment of prescribed 
taxes. But wi th the change of these general condi t ions of property, 
those village-coorrunities lost their functions and, finally, even 
their institutuional character. A similar development is to be 
noticed with regard to the urban artisan corporations, the so-called 
"asnaf" (the "guilds"). As another especially rent-capitalist item, 
Bobek mentions increasing financial encurrberance and indebtedness of 
the peasantry with regard to their landlords. Evidence thereof and 
also of cont inous famines and increasing ccmnercial speculation on 
grain and other crops is rruch more available in the srurces of the 
late 19th century than in the earlier ones. 
About 1870, the areas t radi t ionally reserved f or the cul tivation of 
grain were drasticly restricted in order to intensify the cultiva-
tion of poppy. This was rm.inly supported and even executed by 
individuals belonging to the private circle of the Shah himself. To 
these people, the profits through international opiurrr-trade were 
obvirusly rrnre attractive than the population's supply with cereals 
and bread. Thi s i s to be seen in connect ion wi th the rapidly 
increasing indebt edness of the sta t e, another phencmencn unknown 
unt i 1 then. The following y~ars were rm.rked by several st rong 
famines. They used to be artificially prolonged by speculaticn on 
excess profits and finally became rrnre or less chronic. Direct 
correlaticn between the continuation of famines and the holding back 
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of grain from the rmrkets by profit garrblers - frequently the 
landlords themselves - is explicitly documented in the sources. 
Another factor for the lack of grain was that during the seventies 
and the eight i es of the last century, Russian mi 1 i tary agent s 
supplied their armies in the Central Asian carrpaigns with cereals 
mainly through advantageous purchases of lranian grain: Every year 
at spring-time, about the Nauruz-festivities, \lohen the peasants had 
an increased need f or cash money, they sold thei r reserves of 
cereals and seed to the Russians. lt was those and similar practices 
\lhich led to an evergrowing indebtedness co the side of the 
peasants. Prices of bread and grain more than tripled within three 
decades after they had been rather stable for centuries. In 
addition, at that time the practice of pish-furush, rmrked as 
typically rent-capitalist by Ehlers (Marburg), became corrmcn co a 
wide scale: Wealthy persons, well provided with capital, following 
the mentioned Russian habits, used to buy the peasants' shares of 
the f orthcoming crop a t 1 ow cost s. Thus, about the turn of the 
century, i t had become qui te corrmcn in provincial townships and 
cent ers t o expect severe shortages of t rain every year wi thin the 
first weeks after the harvest. By then, people had already got used 
to the idea that last crops would be held back from the market in 
order to gain excess prof i t. 
These and other arguments indicate that those particular socio-
economic conditions, \lhose analysis led to the conception of 
rent-capitalism, were quite late in becoming general and carprehen-
sive in Iran, i .e., not earlier than that particular period \lohen the 
lranian state, rather hesitatingly, atterrpted to adapt its own 
structures to the realities of international econcny and policy. One 
should not forget, however, that this atterrpt happened wi thin the 
same period \lohen colonial, i. e. especial ly Russian and Bri t i sh, 
influence overflowed all spheres of lranian public life. Similar 
statements can easily be made ccocerning other Middle East 
countries. Thus, the irrprovement and general expansion of aspects of 
the "rent-capitalist form of society" obviously took place sinul-
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taneously wi th the increasing expansion of colonial interest s, and 
wi th the f i rst "roodem" changes of social orders and admini st rat ive 
systems in the lslamic world. lt is quite understandable that 
nowadays, ~en, e.g., geographers consider the roost recent apects of 
roodemization they would be inclined to judge upon conditions rooted 
in the 19th century as if they were genuine historical elements of 
rrore ancient origin. Yet, there are enough reasons to presume that, 
in the light of historical research, rrany so-called rent-capitalist 
aspects of recent Oriental societies rmy result from rather recent 
development s. 
VII 1. 
Tue present investigation into selected fields of economic history 
of lslamic Iran has sane severe shortcomings. First of all, 
conclusions conceming socio-economic aspect s were roost ly based on 
institutional and administrative circumstances. l have repeatedly 
neglected the irrportant question regarding the concrete social 
relat ions that had f ormed the pre-condi t ions f or certain inst i tu-
ti ons and juridic or administrative regulations. To a certain extent 
these deficiencies are to be explained by the present state of 
research and the limited accessibility of the sources. Furthennore, 
l have confined myself to certain aspects of agrarian production 
mly. I scarcely touched such irrportant fields as urban production 
and features of tribal or naradic life. Therefore, it rmy well be 
possible that in some cases secondary aspect s were overst ressed. 
Nevertheless, the f ollowing conclusi ons seem to be just i f i ed: If 
ever the rent-capitalist concept is valid for defining an entire 
historical socio-economic forrration - and this is not the place to 
venture a final answer - then it is obviously valid only for the 
relatively recent history of Iran and other lslamic regions. Yet, 
rent-capitalism fails in describing the general socio-economic 
character of roore ancient historical periods. This does not mean, 
however, that we totally lack evidence for rent-capitalist practices 
in earlier epoches; still, these practices were confined to limited 
economic sectors. In this connection I pointed out the early Islamic 
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qati 'a-systern, certain fields of agrarian producticn like lands 
belonging to the categories of waqf, nulk or khass. For roore precise 
staternents concerning this rra.tter, one has to wait for future 
research. For exarrple, one should not forget "Mlat Rodinson and Cahen 
called "capitalist sectors" within preroodern societies, a ccncept 
closely related to "Mlat I\1:irx called the "antediluvial capital". Such 
concept s, I bel ieve, should be thoroughly studi ed and analysed in 
order to investigate "Mlether they bore any rent-capitalist aspects. 
A rra.j or irrpul se for geographi c research on urban dwell ing and l if e 
in the lslamic world has been triggered by Bobek's ideas. ~reover, 
the theme "lslamic cities" or "cities in the lslamic world" has 
mean"Mlile becane a rrajor subject of interest also to the Orienta-
list s. 
I had suggested that various aspects "Mlich could be called 
rent-capi tal ist did not gain a general and corrprehensive dimension 
in Oriental societies earlier than in the period in "Mlich European 
colcnialism was rapidly expanding. This suggesticn raises the 
question "Mlether there were any causal connections between these two 
sinultaneous events, i.e. colonial expansicn and the general 
infiltration of non-European societies by rent-capitalism. But, this 
questicn goes beyond the therra.tic frame of this paper. 
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